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John Crawford’s role m development was that of a mlddle- 
man so de_splsed m much of the writing about agrlculturil 
development He marshalled mformatlon to persuade polltl- 
clans to put m place pollcles that would raise agricultural 
productlvlty John Crawford understood the theory of devel- 
opment He knew how dlfflcTilt It was to introduce new-poll- 
cles and how to implement them effectively He had more 
- experience of poverty than most of us On his way to school 
he had carried his boots over his shoulder so that they would 
last for his brothers and sisters But he did not permit his 
_ - emotions to override his Judgment Consequently, his work - 
on Indian agricultural pohcy alone enabled him to make a 
greater contrlbutlon to ralsmg the living standards of poor 
people than most development leaders make m a lifetime In 
his last years, while aware that many people m developing 
countries were still very poor, he saw that most were mark- 
edly better fed, clothed, sheltered and educated than they 
had been m the 1930s when he first focused on llvmg stan- 
dard-issues John Crawford had seen how effective national 
development pollcles could be He believed that most coup- 
tries could develop much faster if their polltlcal leaders 
chose national pollcles that pursued development for the 
mass of the population, instead of serving narrow sectional 
interests 
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I shall argue that theory,the :utiderstanding of the devel- 
opment process-is a critical input intq national policy-mak- 
ing. If economic theory is not understood, demagogy can take 
over. Many governments are able$6. pursue narrow sectional 
interests by’adopting a mask of rhetoric that blames bogey- 
men and .thiz international economy for developing countries’ 
ills. But all-couritries face the same international economic 
environment.. Sotie prosper. Some stagnate.- Only domestic 
policy reform can remove the real obstacles’ to agricultural 
development. 
Agricultural development: definition, and brief 
overview 
In countries with large agricultural sectors, overall devel- 
opment is clearly dependent on agricultural development. De- 
veloping countries have not been able to achieve high and 
sustained economic growth withou’t substantial increases in 
agricultural productivity. Agricultural development may re- 
sult from increasing food and raw material supplies for the 
domestic market [self-sufficiency], from export growth (with 
or without imports) or from a combination of these. Provided 
production is efficient by international standards, and pro- 
vided that it is environmentally efficient, the pattern of pro- 
duction is irrelevant. Following comparative advantage is a 
source of growth, while self-sufficiency regardless of cost 
effectiveness is a high-cost recipe which only very rich coun- 
tries can afford. 
Agricultural development only takes place when increased 
prodtictivity and output are reflected in rising re&incomes 
(subsistence and cash) and hence in rising rural standards of 
living. The countryside’s econon$c activities -deepen. Off- 
farm employment increases. Building materials, furniture 
and domestic utensils are produced for the local market. 
Some food ‘is processed to increase its storage life. Some 
manufacturing expands to reach regional and national con- 
sumers. Country markets, stores and businesses evolve. Com- 
mercial financial institutions compete for farmers’ business. 
Families acquire sewing machines; later, they b,uy their 
2 clothes in Shops. Carts replace people’s backs, and trucks 
replace carts to move goods to markets. Buses run. Schools 
are built. Health clinics become established. 
Improvements in living standards are not only material. 
Greater income security is often the prime benefit of agri- 
cultural development for rural families. Income distribution 
may not improve greatly (it may even worsen), but poverty is 
reduced by the creation of new employment opportunities 
and by poor people’s access to public goods, notably educa- 
tion. Social horizons expand as villages acquire radios and 
televisions. There are surpluses for traditional festivals and 
visits to town. Improved basic education, skill formation and 
access to secondary education broaden opportunities for 
rural youth. Education enables those who stay behind in 
agricultural and non-agricultural rural activities, as well as 
those who move to urban areas, to participate in the applica- 
tion of new, more productive technologies. Rural incomes 
and national productivity rise further. 
While improvements in standards of living affect all, chil- 
dren and women benefit most. Rising standards of living, 
together with measures to eradicate diseases such as malaria 
and cholera, have an almost immediate impact on infant and 
child mortality, thus giving parents a choice in determining 
family size. When women are spared the burden of constant 
child bearing (as they already are in most East Asian coun- 
tries), their health improves. So does their capacity to work 
in and out of the home, They can earn cash income and pay 
greater attention to nurturing the family with commensurate 
effects on the health and.skills of future generations. The 
enrollment of girls in school affects agricultural productivity 
directly, particularly in the many countries where women 
are the mainstay of agriculture as, for example, in sub- 
Saharan Africa and Melanesia. The education of girls and 
employment opportunities outside the home are principal 
determinants of population planning. 
Agricultural development thus reaches far beyond the dry 
statistics of agricultural yields, relative commodity prices, 
farm size and income, the availability of water, flood control, 
or the weight of sheep and cattle. But the dry statistics cannot 
be neglected. They are the basis of analyses necessary for 3 
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agricultural development through increasing productivity. 
Where productivity has not been the primary objective” of 
agricultural development, output and incomes have stag- 
nated and even slid back in terms of per capita output. Living 
standards have remained low and even declined. Rural devel- 
opment without rising productivity has been a miserable 
failure. 
Trade-offs between relieving today’s poverty and achiev- 
ing tomorrow’s prosperity were not evaluated in the 1970s 
despite earlier “rural development” experience. India had 
learnt in the 1950s that community development did not give 
sufficient focus to agricultural growth and hence to agri- 
cultural development. It now seems that the great Chinese 
experiment of providing nearly a billion people with “basic 
human needs” meant very low and stagnant living standards 
for the masses. China’s GNP growth figures for the 1960s and 
1970s are almost certainly exaggerated. Rural incomes and 
living standards only began to rise with profit-oriented farm- 
ing in the late-1970s. But progress is still halting because 
China has been mired in structural and organizational weak- 
nesses. It will take a generation’s unremitting political and 
economic effort to overcome the price distortions and sec- 
toral imbalances created by the policies that were hailed as 
having achieved “rural development.” The vested interests 
in support of low-productivity structures remain strongly en- 
trenched in the countryside. 
The greatest achievements in agricultural development 
have undoubtedly taken place in Northeast and Southeast 
Asian countries that place their emphasis on growth. With 
some exceptions (Burma, Kampuchea, Lao PDR, the Philip- 
pines, and Vietnam) rural standards of living have risen dra- 
matically since the late 1940s. Formerly significant grain im- 
porters such as Indonesia have achieved self-sufficiency cost- 
effectively. Village life has changed beyond expectation. Sub- 
stantial migration from rural areas to towns and cities has 
provided new openings, because agricultural development 
has been part of rapid overall growth. 
The largest concentration of the world’s poor people is in 
4 the sweep of land from South to East Asia that makes up 
Bangladesh, China, India, and Pakistan. Of the wofld’s 5 bil- 
lion people, 45 percent live in these countries (Table 1). Until 
the end of World War II, extreme poverty held the predomi- 
nantly rural population in thrall. The majority (more than 80 
percent) of people in this Asian belt still live in rural areas, 
but since the 197Os, improving economic management, in- 
vestment and new technology have transformed agricultural 
productivity and rural living standards. Agricultural output 
has expanded more rapidly than population growth. Policies 
put in place in the 1970s and 1980s have given the most 
populous countries an agricultural base that could enable 
them to become modestly prosperous middle-income coun- 
tries within the next generation-if they were to put in place 
a vigorous program of economy-wide policy reform. 
Table 1. Population, GNP per capita and share of global 
GNP by region, 1986. 
Region’ 
Share of 
Population GNP per world 
(Mil- (Per- capita GNP 
lion) cent) KJS$) (Percent) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 440 .400 1 
Latin America 405 1,600 4 
South Asia and China 2,155 45 300 4 
Southeast, Northeast 
Asia and Pacific 413 9 800 2 
Mediterranean and 
Middle East 336 7 1,800 9 
Industrial countries: 
Centrally planned 461 9 8b 
Market-oriented 646 13 14;ooo 72 
World Total 4,856 100 . 100 
‘These percentages are substantially distorted by the use of official rather 
than purchasing-power-parity exchange rates. The share of developing 
countries would rise to some 30 per cent of total output, the centrally 
planned industrial countries’ share would remain unchanged, and the mar- 
ket-oriented countries’ share would fall to some 60 per cent of world output 
if purchasing power parity was used to calculate income shares. 
“GDP for centrally planned economies has been estimated from various 
sources. Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1988, Oxford 
University Press, New York. 
‘See Annex 1 for regional description by country. 5 
Agricultural development has a long history in Mediterra- 
nean and Middle Eastern countries. The past 40 years have 
built on historical skills. Urbanization has been rapid, soak- 
ing up surplus labor from the countryside. Standards of liv- 
ing have risen correspondingly in most countries (though not 
in Egypt and war-torn Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Lebanon). 
In Latin America, the dependencia interpretation of devel- 
opment problems has enabled a dual pattern of agricultural 
development to persist: Unproductive peasant and latifundia 
agriculture continues to exist side-by-side with interna- 
tionally competitive commercial crops. Differences in living 
standards among and within regions remain correspon- 
dingly high. Urban concentration (historically high in Ar- 
gentina, Brazil and Chile, for example), has been a major 
escape route from rural poverty, but urbanization is not asso- 
ciated with the high rates of economic growth that leading 
Northeast and Southeast Asian countries have achieved. 
The African countries south of the Sahara encompass less 
than 10 percent of the world’s population. Starting from low-, 
levels, agricultural productivity has stagnated and even de- 
clined in most of these countries in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Relatively rich endowments of agricultural land are being 
diminished by bverutilization with poor technology to meet 
the needs of rapidly growing populations. Inappropriate poli- 
cies, in extreme cases reflecting wars and political chaos, are 
impoverishing a potentially rich region. 
The growth of value added in agriculture has remained 
relatively slow, and it has not varied greatly among regions 
(Table 2). However, the pace.of growth has been highest in the 
market-oriented countries. South Asia and China have only 
made progress in the last 15 years. In Africa south of the 
Sahara, agricultural growth has declined during this time. 
Dependencia- and equity-led strategies have only deliv- 
ered the bitter taste of frustrated expectations. Northeast and 
Southeast Asian policies have demonstrated that growth-led 
development with proper attention to national employment 
6 creation and a product’ive emphasis on public goods is more 
Table 2. Average annual real growth of value added in 
agriculture, 196586 (percent). 
Region 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Latin America and Caribbean 
South Asia and China 
East Asia and Pacific 











Source: International Economic Data Bank, Australian National 
University, September 1988. 
equity-oriented, even in the short-to-medium term, than 
strategies directly focused on poverty alleviation. It also re- 
solves the balance-of-payments problems. 
Policies for agricultural development 
Farmers are the central figures of agricultural develop- 
ment. Ignoring the role of the farming family as entrepre- 
neurs, risk-takers, managers, innovators and workers leads to 
stagnation. But the role of government is equally central. 
Governments create the framework in which the agricultural 
sector operates: they are responsible for peace with neighbor- 
ing countries and within the country; they must ensure the 
rule of law for rich and poor alike; either explicitly or by 
default, they design and implement the policies that deter- 
mine how farming and other economic units act in an econ- 
omy; and particularly at early levels of development, they are 
responsible for the construction and maintenance of social 
and physical infrastructure. 
As theoretical understanding of development is key to the 
formulation of a country’s policy framework, theory has to be 
constantly tested and developed within a country to be per- 
suasive. Policy formulation is highly influenced by the quali- 
ty of scholarship and public debate that convey the analyti- 7 
cal understanding of the determinants of agricultural (and 
other] development into the public arena. The public debate 
influences politicians, public servants and lobbyists. If intel- 
lectual leaders do not understand why protection harms the 
economy, the protectionist lobby will be strong. If a free- 
trade intellectual environment is established, the demand for 
protection will fall and the supply of protection will be di- 
minished so that protection will be much more costly to 
obtain than in a dependencia environment. Policy implemen- 
tation is similarly affected by political economy The rates of 
repayment of subsidized agricultural loans or the percentage 
of water charge payments are not determined by chance. 
They depend on the confidence people have in a government 
and their understanding of the purpose and use of the pay- 
ments. There are many examples of changes in public atti- 
tudes following public education campaigns on the need to 
pay taxes [Spain], customs duties (Indonesia) or water 
charges [Malaysia). 
Major ideological differences are reflected in differences 
in regional achievements. In most Northeast and Southeast 
Asian countries., considerable analytical sophistication has 
been combined with pragmatism. Extremes of economic ide- 
ology have been avoided. Countries with very different social 
and political structures and historical backgrounds (that is, 
with different “initial conditions”) have been able to make 
substantial advances in agricultural development. On the 
other hand, governments committed to central planning and 
communal agriculture, albeit in the name of grass-roots de- 
velopment and equity, have, stifled development, inflicting 
unnecessary hardship on their peoples. So have governments 
pursuing wealth for sectoral intersts without regard to 
equity. 
In all but a few countries it is no longer feasible to increase 
agricultural output by .bringing new land into cultivation. At 
the margin, agricultural use of land is biting into forests and 
water sheds worldwide, creating major environmental prob- 
lems. In some,countries, agricultural land will have to be 
returned to forest for cost-effective environmental manage- 
6 ment. For agriculture to keep pace with population increases 
until stable populations are reached, means raising agri- 
cultural output through productivity growth. This requires 
three conditions: appropriate economic policies, investment 
in physical and social infrastructure, particularly education, 
and new technology. Policies may affect agriculture in a sec- 
toral context or they may be national economic policies that 
are not thought to affect agriculture primarily, if at all. The 
latter policies include fiscal, monetary, exchange rate, trade 
and manpower policies. Such policies have no less direct 
effects on agriculture for being designed without a great deal 
of reference to agricultural develolpment. 
The policy mix affecting agriculture grows over time, of- 
ten with contrary and confused effects. Some sectoral poli- 
cies (subsidies, import tariffs and quantitative import restric- 
tions) protect agriculture, while others (export taxes and 
high transport costs] tax it. As countries develop, there is a 
tendency within the agricultural sector to move from export 
taxes to protective measures, that is, from a bias against agri- 
culture to its protection. But sectoral policies usually have 
far less impact than national economy-wide policies. Re- 
search on the effects of economy-wide policies on agriculture 
has thus far largely been limited to the trade and exchange 
rate policies. The findings suggest that these policies alone 
have twice as important an impact on agriculture as sectoral 
policies: their effect is to create a bias against agriculture, 
even if sectoral policies seek to protect agriculture. When the 
effects of financial, fiscal, monetary and manpower policies 
and distortions in infrastructural investment are evaluated, 
the bias against agriculture is likely to be much greater than 
is now thought. 
Sectoral policies 
The importance of theorems linking allocative efficiency 
to competitive market prices in agricultural development is 
increasingly becoming recognized, as government-induced 
price distortions undermine agricultural productivity in 
many developing countries. Price distortions are, of course, 
always introduced for the best possible reasons. Few govern- 9 
ments are so cynical that they deliberately set out to under- 
mine their agricultural sectors. Yet many do so. 
Some governments seek to control prices to eliminate mid- 
dlemen who are thought to raise prices unduly between the 
farmgate and the marketplace for their own profit. In prac- 
tice, the middleman’s removal usually reduces prices at the 
farmgate and increases them to the consumer. The elements 
of monopoly that are the true cause of some middlemen’s 
“super profits” are not reduced, but exacerbated by the re- 
placement of middlemen by public controls or publicly-own- 
ed marketing corporations. By ignoring quality issues, dis- 
torting price differentials among qualities and seasons, 
together with the ineptness and corruption they breed, pub- 
lic marketing organizations are important causes of agri- 
cultural stagnation. 
Price ceilings, compulsory deliveries at low prices, and 
similar measures are used widely to assure supplies of cheap 
food for politically powerful urban groups. Agriculture is 
taxed for industrial development. Taxes on exports (except in 
optimum tariff situations) have similar effects on farm in- 
come, savings, investment and productivity. They account for 
substantial shares (up to 30 percent) in many countries. They 
are so high in some cases that they discourage peasants from 
harvesting their crops. 
Reducing prices of farm outputs leads to subsidies for in- 
puts to hold up farm incomes and ensure that farmers are 
prepared to take the risks necessary to produce crops. Farm- 
ers require cheap credit, cheap chemicals and cheap ma- 
chines to be able to continue to subsidize urban groups with 
cheap food; one subsidy leads to another, distorting prices 
until even sophisticated analysis cannot determine the actual 
cost of goods and services at international prices at any point 
in the chain of transactions leading from farming to domestic 
and external consumption. 
The influence of land tenure on agricultural development 
has received a great deal of attention. It is often used to draw 
attention away from an inappropriate policy framework. But 
provided that the farm family is adequately recompensed for 
its labor, capital and other inputs, and provided that it has 
security of tenure, the form of tenure is unimportant. The 
agricultural “revolutions” of England and Japan took place in 
a tenancy environment. If rapacious, monopolistic land- 
lords-whether they be private or state-are allowed by the 
government to take an undue share of the farmers’ output 
through crop-sharing, high rents, compulsory low delivery 
prices or high input costs, agricultural development will be 
stalled. 
Some of the most rapidly developing countries have been 
able to stimulate agricultural development without land re- 
form (Thailand and Indonesia). Land reform may be of great 
benefit in some circumstances (as in the post-World War II 
situation in Northeast Asia), but it may be ineffectual despite 
several attempts at reform [as in Mexico and the Philippines). 
In some countries at early stages of development (as in sub- 
Saharan Africa and the South Pacific), communal ownership 
of land tenure is a greater obstacle to agricultural develop- 
ment than tenancy arrangements. This very mixed experi- 
ence suggests that agriculture can develop with various forms 
of land tenure if the rest of the policy framework is 
appropriate. 
National policies 
Conventionally, agriculture is regarded as contributing to 
overall growth by shedding workers to supply labor for sec- 
ondary and tertiary sectors, growing food supplies for urban 
workers, and providing raw materials for industry. Prosper- 
ous farmers broaden the market for goods and services. Spe- 
cifically, manufacturing provides chemicals and machinery 
for agricultural producers, and services provide the linkages 
that bring goods to the market at home and abroad. Such 
“linkages” are largely tautological. The conundrum that faces 
policy analysts is that while most developing countries claim 
to want to foster agricultural development, their macro- 
economic, trade, manpower and sectoral policies are inimi- 
cal to agricultural progress. 11 
Macroeconomic competence, depending very considera- 
bly on the outcome of the ideological debate, is a key compo- 
nent of the indirect policy framework that determines agri- 
cultural outcomes. Public expenditures must in broad terms 
be matched by public revenues to stabilize fiscal policies if 
monetary policies are to work toward keeping domestic 
prices stable. Monetary policies also have to be able to keep 
the rate of exchange stable without distorting the price of 
credit. 
Repressed financial systems severely curtail the availabil- 
ity of credit in rural areas. If attempts are made to offset the 
lack of rural credit by special agricultural credit institutions, 
and particularly if credit is subsidized, the ensuing rationing 
will favor rich farmers. Farmers do not pay back loans in 
subsidized credit schemes. The system breaks down. 
The test of the appropriateness of macroeconomic policies 
is the level of inflation. Several East Asian countries (Mal- 
aysia, Singapore and Thailand) have been able to keep their 
domestic inflation under international levels since the’l960s 
when inflation began to emerge as a problem in industrial 
countries. Most of the other countries in the region brought 
inflationary episodes under control quickly, once they em- 
barked on a growth strategy. India and Pakistan were able to 
stimulate agricultural development in the 1970s and 1980s 
because their macroeconomic policies had achieved price 
stability. Economists may argue whether inflation of 1 or 2 
percent is preferable to inflation of 3 to 5 percent, but there is 
now little disagreement about the damage that even medium 
levels of inflation inflict on development. 
Farmers may at first be overjoyed as farm product prices 
rise, but the costs of inputs, transport and other charges 
tends to rise more rapidly. If governments resort to printing 
money to avoid the political pain of taxation, the lowest in- 
come groups, generally rural-dwellers, are the principal vic- 
tims: in place of taxation according to income, the poorest 
are taxed most by inflation. Taxation through inflation may 
avoid confrontation with wealthy lobby groups, but it means 
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that the rich, who are the main beneficiaries of public expen- 
diture, are stealing from the poor. Agricultural development 
cannot take place in such an environment. 
Macroeconomic measures are, unfortunately, the “sleep- 
ers” of economic policy. If price stability prevails, savings 
and investment are high and productivity and output are 
growing rapidly, macroeconomic .policies are invisible. If 
prices balloon and savings and investment slow, it is gener- 
ally too late for easy remedies. Stabilizing an inflationary 
economy is so costly that if it is undertaken ineptly, the polit- 
ical repercussions may create a backlash against the re- 
formers. Revolution is often the outcome. 
Most developing countries [except city economies) have 
used tariff and non-tariff barriers to subsidize manufacturing 
and selected service sectors. Some countries have made ma- 
jor efforts to reduce protection, but with only one or two 
exceptions (Chile and Taiwan), protection for manufacturing 
remains a major instrument of policy. Offsetting protection 
by export incentives is extremely inefficient; countries find it 
difficult to evaluate the cost of effective assistance even if 
they wish to do so. 
Protection involves an overvaluation of the exchange rate. 
Overvaluation is often exacerbated by imprudent macro- 
economic policies leading to inflation. Frequent devaluations 
make exports competitive for a time but raise the cost of 
imported inputs and thus disadvantage agricultural exports 
as well as stimulating further inflation, The exchange rate is 
rarely in equilibrium. 
Slow industrial and service growth limits urban develop- 
ment and hence the urban demand for rural goods. Urban- 
dwellers can only buy rural goods if they have jobs. Urban 
employment creation is thus a critical aspect of agricultural 
growth. 
Subsidies to industry are not only direct. They may take 
the form of public ownership or licensing regulations that 
create monopolies with high prices that also create a bias 
against agriculture. 
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“Booming” sector effects also tend to create biases against 
agricultural development.. Whether they result from natural 
resource development, or, in small countries, from high per 
capita aid inflows, “booming” sectors tend to draw resources 
to the “booming” sector (mining or, in the aid case, govern- 
ment). Agriculture is starved of resources. If the “booming” 
sector declines, the country’s economy cannot respond to the 
new demands made on it. Mineral-rich and highly-aided 
countries consequently have very weak agricultural sectors. 
Some countries are recognizing the high costs of protec- 
tion and “booming” sector effects, but instead of dealing 
with the cause of the problem, they are subsidizing agri- 
cultural production to ensure adequate domestic supplies of 
food and agricultural raw materials. The net effect of layer 
upon layer of subsidy is to introduce inefficiency throughout 
the economy. Poorly informed and hence arbitrary judgments 
of public servants replace markets. A ratchet effect leads to 
new subsidies as lobbyists and rent-seekers ask for new con- 
cessions. The operation of the economy is slowed by moun- 
tains of paper moving from in-tray to out-tray and yet another 
in-tray. Bureaucrats become rent-seekers as opportunities for 
promotion, material benefits and power become apparent. 
Overall, indirect policy effects often continue to negate 
subsidies. 
Combined with the desire to override market trends by 
planning, the typical developing country has a vast bureau- 
cratic superstructure that creates an environment inimical to 
growth and development. Farmers are bombarded by instruc- 
tions and requests for information as the rules of the game 
constantly change. The only way to benefit farming families 
and agricultural development is to reduce substantially gov- 
ernment intervention in the industrial and the service, as 
well as in the agricultural, sectors. To accelerate agricultural 
(and other) growth, the overall policy framework must be 
coherent. Specific policies for agriculture will then be large- 
ly unnecessary. 
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Infrastructure and technology 
Infrastructural facilities must be available at interna- 
tionally competitive prices if farmers are to be able to meet 
competition at home and to export. To activate markets and 
make it possible for farmers to purchase goods at competitive 
F- “; prices, storage and transport facilities must be available. 
Schools and clinics in villages and country towns have to be 
’ ,i 
,4 built and staffed. Major investments must be planned and 
implemented if flood and drought control, essential to the 
use of new agricultural technologies, is to take place. Elec- 
tricity is needed to stretch the day, keep tools sharp, pump 
water and provide light at night to maintain reading skills. 
Reducing the prices of infrastructural facilities below inter- 
national prices (or even below high domestic costs) may cre- 
ate favorable subsidies in the short run, but acute bottlenecks 
will develop in the long run as roads, bridges and other facili- 
ties cannot be replicated and maintained. Appropriate de- 
sign, cost-effective construction and high capital utilization 
play a role in determining the efficiency of infrastructure. 
With low incremental capital output ratios and high operat- 
ing efficiency, countries need to save and invest much less 
than those that develop infrastructure wastefully. 
Developing countries with major achievements in agri- 
cultural development have made sizeable investments in in- 
frastructure for agricultural development. A commercial 
wholesaling, retailing and financial network backs the pro- 
duction, quality control and distribution process for domes- 
tic and foreign markets. Infrastructure stretches from farm to 
4 village, from village to township and district center, from 
district center to provincial capital and national metropolis. rj 
Without such facilities, agriculture cannot develop. 
.A 
The bias of public goods against agriculture is most mark- 
ed in the inadequacy of rural’educational facilities. Popula- 
tion planning is strongly associated with income levels, but 
earlier and stronger tendencies to limit family size in urban 
areas are also attributable to better formal and informal edu- 
cation facilities for girls and to better access to employment 
outside the home in urban areas. 
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Schooling difficulties compounded by poorly trained 
teachers, inappropriate curricula and difficulty of access to 
secondary schools in rural areas are also frequently sub- 
jected to limited horizons. Not only educational systems, but 
so-called expert advisers, rule that country children should 
receive a different, more practical education than urban 
(middle-class] children. For a population that will have to be 
increasingly involved in sophisticated farming choices, non- 
farming rural employment or urban -employment, such dis- 
crimination undermines potential income-earning 
opportunities. 
The “green revolution” has illustrated dramatically what 
new technology can accomplish if combined with competi- 
tive market prices and high investment in effective infra- 
structure. The “green revolution” made Asian countries 
‘largely self-sufficient in grains. Major productivity increases 
have also taken place in crops such as cocoa, coffee and palm 
oil. All these developments are part of the technological ad- 
vances that have transformed productivity in agriculture 
worldwide during the past 40 years, particularly in indus- 
trial countries. Some developing countries are catching up to 
developing countries in agricultural productivity, but many 
are barely holding their own. The “gap” between the produc- 
tivity of poorer developing countries and that of industrial 
countries appears to be increasing. With the breakthroughs 
in biotechnology that are now taking place, changes in agri- 
cultural practices, associated processing, and other aspects 
of post-harvest technology are accelerating rapidly. It can be 
confidently predicted that there will be at least as much 
change during the next 40 years as there has been since 
World War II. 
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Few countries’ policies give adequate recognition to the 
cumulative impact of appropriate pricing policy, investment 
in infrastructure and techological developments. The devel- 
opment and adaptation of new technology is capital-, partic- 
ularly human capital-, intensive; that is, it requires mostly 
those resources in which developing countries are most dis- 
advantaged. Commonsense, as well as economic theory, sug- 
gest that while it is necessary to push the development of 
I 
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agricultural and related sciences to the point at which imag- 
inative and creative adaptation is feasible in developing 
countries, lower-income countries should leave the high de- 
velopmental costs of pure science to higher-income countries 
and focus on those adaptive technologies that will most rap- 
idly increase their productivity. 
The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Re- 
search (CGIAR) family of international agricultural centers 
provides external economies and economies of scale to the 
development of technology that developing countries could 
not afford individually. The development of techniques that 
measure the impact of research by crop and farm environ- 
ment has made it possible to review the research program in 
terms of economic impact. It is clear that here too the trade- 
offs between an emphasis on growth and rising income and 
attempts to improve standards of living of poor rural people 
directly (for example, by raising protein levels of grain) are 
very considerable. Productivity gains are assured if existing 
technology is adapted. The research costs of improving liv- 
ing standards directly are much higher because they require 
new scientific breakthroughs. 
It is well-established that investment in the development 
of agricultural technology-up to some point yet to be deter- 
mined-has high returns. However, it has been acknowl- 
edged since the centers’ infancy that their role is only as 
effective as their collaboration with centers of advanced sci- 
entific development in industrial countries, on the one hand, 
and research efforts in developing countries, on the other. In 
many areas, agricultural research must be in the public do- 
main because the benefits are appropriated by thousands of 
farmers. In other areas such as rubber, cocoa and copra, how- 
ever, growers’ associations are now developing new technolo- 
gy. Some of the externalities are being internalized by the 
production group. In other cases, for example in the use of 
fertilizer and the development of new seeds, commercial 
firms are undertaking wide-ranging research, As research 
must be specific not only to a country and a region but even 
to a locality, it is costly. Tax-payers are clearly less willing to 
contribute to public research than in the past when private 17 
firms were not active in agricultural research. In the highly 
competitive environment that is developing in biotechnology 
and other areas, farmers’ interests are likely to be well 
served. The determination of research areas that should re- 
main in the public domain has, therefore, become an impor- 
tant policy issue. 
Inputs into research are determined at the country policy 
level, in resources devoted to the training and maintenance 
of scientists and the resources devoted to research institu- 
tions, field stations, and extension work. The balance be- 
tween the international and national efforts must therefore 
be kept under review. International funds tend to stimulate 
but also to substitute for local funding in developing coun- 
tries. International research centers, particularly in the new 
environment that encourages research by the private sector, 
are in some danger because, at the margin, some have become 
oases of technocratic luxury and scientific tourism. Recogni- 
tion of the role of the private sector is likely to be essential to 
the continuation of a well-funded and cost-effective interna- 
tional effort that will underwrite rising agricultural 
productivity. 
Sociopolitical inputs into agricultural development usu- 
ally represent the most difficult policy aspects. Some coun- 
tries have experimented successfully with rural organiza- 
tions that have become embedded in national life. The 
pioneering rural development orientation of the Joint Com- 
mission on Rural Reconstruction in Taiwan, the New Com- 
munity Movement in the Republic of Korea, the rural devel- 
opment drive in Thailand and successive Inpres programs in 
Indonesia are examples of government rural development 
programs that helped to accelerate the speed of agricultural 
development, to increase the benefits, and to spread them 
more equitably than might otherwise have been the case. 
These programs emphasized the organization of village 
“public goods,” notably education. Agricultural extension 
was an important though separate component of these pro- 
grams. All were backed by the reduction of price biases 
against farmers and by national investment in such infra- 
18 structural facilities as roads, railways, and ports. They were 
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undertaken in rapidly growing economies. Emigration from 
rural to urban areas followed employment opportunities. 
World trade in agricultural products 
International trade in agricultural “commodities” has 
been a central issue in the development debate since the 
194Os, but to little purpose. Trade in agricultural products 
has grown steadily, though not as rapidly as exports of other 
goods and services which have come to dominate world 
trade. Exports play a critical role in growth and development, 
in part, by overcoming balance-of-payments constraints, but 
mainly through the impact of trade on productive efficiency. 
The volumes of agricultural trade are relatively stable, but 
prices of primary commodities fluctuate more than those of 
industrial goods and services. This much is well known and 
agreed. The factors that cause those fluctuations-vagaries of 
weather, low elasticity of supply (even for annual crops), long 
lead investment cycles (for tree crops), changes in the com- 
plementarity and substitutability of products, changes in 
tastes, changes in production technology, monopsonistic and 
monopolistic practices-are also well known, although an- 
alysts may differ about their relative importance. Price fluc- 
tuations lead to income fluctuations for farm families and 
income and balance-of-payments fluctuations for 
governments. 
Price-support schemes were devised in the late 1940s and 
1950s to reduce price fluctuations and, it was thought, to 
stabilize incomes. They have almost always failed in develop- 
ing countries, not only because managements of such 
schemes have been unable to deal with the complexities of 
stabilization funds, but mainly because eliminating price 
fluctuations removes signals to farmers about the relative 
profitability of crops. It is usually impossible to distinguish 
short-term from long-term price changes. Price stabilization 
usually destabilizes incomes. The short-term effects of fluc- 
tuations in barter terms of trade, which have to be managed 
to avoid damage to macroeconomic stability, can be offset by 
balance-of-payments support. The International Monetary 
Fund has accordingly developed an efficacious form of bal- 19 
ante-of-payments stabilization. As part of their national poli- 
cy stance, Northeast and Southeast Asian countries have ac- 
cordingly drawn on the IMF’s stabilization facilities in good 
time to avoid balance-of-payments difficulties, rather than 
resorting to commercial bank borrowing. The development of 
futures markets has enabled traders to protect themselves 
against excessive risk from price fluctuations, However, di- 
versification within agriculture and out of agriculture into 
industry and services is the ultimate defense against com- 
modity price fluctuations. 
Farmers increasingly rely on accurate price information as 
part of the environment for development. Telex machines tick 
in remote villages, not only in Northeast and Southeast Asia, 
but in other developing countries. Whatever truth there may 
have been in hypotheses that farmers were more interested in 
stabilizing than maximizing their incomes (the backward 
sloping supply curve) 40 years ago, it is now clear that from 
distant villages in China’s hinterland to South Pacific micro- 
states, farmers understand how to increase their income if 
they have access to markets for inputs and outputs, capital, 
technology and labor. Attempts to eliminate price fluctua- 
tions undermine the basic framework essential to 
development. 
A second characteristic of commodity prices relates to a 
long-term trend for primary products to decline in terms of 
purchasing power. There can be no doubt that prices of agri- 
cultural goods (like other goods and services) have steadily 
fallen, as technological change has increased productivity. A 
kilogram of rice, a ton of rubber, a liter of vegetable oil require 
less effort in earning power than 40, 100 or 200 years ago. In 
competitive conditions, everyone-farmers, intermediaries, 
and consumers-benefits. The principal objective of eco- 
nomic management and technological change is to reduce 
prices so that individuals can reduce the efforts they have to 
make to earn their living. Agricultural development has ma- 
terially contributed to this objective. 
Whether the prices of agricultural products have been fal- 
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ling faster than the prices of industrial goods and services is 
debatable. The high agricultural protection of the European 
Community, the United States, Japan (and more recently, of 
rapidly developing economies such as the Republic of Korea 
and Taiwan) has distorted world markets so that the benefits 
of technological change since World War II have not been 
reflected in an appropriate fall in prices. Production has con- 
sequently been excessive from time to time, failing to take 
into account the developments that have made the world’s 
most populous countries self-sufficient in grains. Evalua- 
tions of the impact of agricultural protectionism suggest that 
it is responsible for only a minor part of the long-term fall in 
agricultural prices. The main impact is to lower living stan- 
dards in the protectionist countries. In industrial countries, 
because of wage rigidities, agricultural protection substan- 
tially lowers domestic employment creation. 
Indexes that measure prices of industrial goods noto- 
riously do not take into account changes in quality. Price 
indexes for services such as telecommunications, transport 
and shipping are not available, but partial data suggest that 
major price declines have taken place. The increase in capital 
service that goods such as tractors or pumps provide, are 
usually undervalued: Productivity in manufacturing and ser- 
vices has risen at least as fast as in agriculture, if not faster, 
suggesting that real prices have fallen faster in manufactured 
goods and services than in agriculture. In any case, barter 
terms of trade do not have a long-term meaning in economic 
analysis. Over the long term, growth is determined by the 
income terms of trade. Many countries deliberately reduce 
their prices as agricultural efficiency increases in order to be 
able to seize a larger share of the market; that is, they deliber- 
ately worsen their barter terms of trade. 
Ultimately, experience indicates, the costs of price fluctua- 
tions and declining relative prices are more than offset by the 
benefits of rising export incomes to farmers and national eco- 
nomic management. But export pessimism is unfortunately a 
self-fulfilling prophecy: countries that failed to take advan- 
tage of export opportunities because they feared the alleged 
inequities of the “international economic order” have been 
poor performers in agricultural development. The highly 
ideological debate that keeps alive outdated concepts of the 
1950s and 1960s bears a great deal of responsibility for the 
failure of many countries to take advantage of export oppor- 
tunities that would have considerably accelerated their agri- 
cultural and overall development. 
Relief and development assistance 
Development assistance for agricultural development ac- 
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counts for about 40 per cent of multilateral development as- 
sistance, though only for about 20 per cent of bilateral devel- 
opment assistance. If investment in infrastructure with 
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impact on agriculture is added, agriculture dominates assis- 
tance efforts. Non-governmental organizations tend to work 
in rural areas because they have a relief rather than develop- 
ment bias. Increasing attention by the media to poverty in 
developing countries is leading to short-term relief at the ex- 
pense of long-term development. Successful development is a 
long and painful process. It does not make news. Only disas- 
ters make headlines. An understanding of the difficult and 
long-term nature of the development process is being eroded 
by donor lobbies seeking instant responses to their aid con- 
tributions. A cynical undercurrent of opinion fears competi- 
tion in world markets for grains, fats and oils, fruit, vegeta- 
bles and other agricultural products. Supporters of this view 
have joined with more sincere groups that genuinely want to 
assist the poor, but insist on doing so in a way that meets the 
donors’ immediate needs rather than the long-term require- 
ments of the recipients. The trade-offs for the donors are often 
diametrically opposed to those for the recipients. The devel- 
opment lobbies thus do not focus on programs that will lead 
to agricultural development, but on those largely composed 
of welfare measures that may push long-term development 
i 
further into the future. 
Experience of community development projects, generally ;r 
referred to as rural development projects, unfortunately bears 
out the analytical conclusion that rural living standards can iii 
be materially affected in the medium-to-long run, and some- 
times even in the short run, only by substantial increases in 
incomes that require fundamental reform of national eco- 
22 nomic policies, particularly in the macroeconomic and trade 
areas, with investment in infrastructure and appropriate 
technology. Sectoral policies are likely to be, at best, gener- 
ally redundant and, at worst, contradictory and counter- 
productive. Improvements in social organization can have 
positive impact on agricultural outcomes only if the other 
necessary inputs are present. Community development ap- 
proaches did not raise output and incomes in India or in 
China. Changes in price incentives, however, had an almost 
instant impact on raising productivity, output, incomes, and 
standards of living in both countries. The major assistance 
effort that supported rural development in sub-Saharan Afri- 
ca has had almost no impact. In some cases, rural develop- 
ment schemes led to falling incomes. Once the external im- 
petus was gone, the new social organization collapsed. 
Community development trades off welfare today against 
income tomorrow. Economics has little guidance to offer on 
the inter-generational allocation of resources, because stan- 
dard of living “outputs” are only partly economic. Nor can a 
democratic process substitute for technocrats. Voters in deve- 
loping or industrial countries cannot handle the abstractions 
involved in comparing today’s income in cash (or in the form 
of public goods) to incomes 30 years hence. The attitudes of 
grandparents and grandchildren toward investment versus 
income are not likely to be mutually consistent or consistent 
over time. However, it is not at all self-evident that poor peas- 
ants prefer immediate increases in living standards to high 
standards of living for their grandchildren. 
The trade-offs between relief and growth cannot be argued 
in absolute terms. Extreme destitution-floods, famines or 
earthquakes-require prompt humanitarian responses. 
Some of these disasters are unavoidable, but some, like fam- 
ines, are man-made. Famines, in particular, do not arise from 
food shortages as such, but from national economic (and po- 
litical) policies that deny people; incomes to buy food. Non- 
governmental organizations can bring relief to communities 
struck by disaster, but only if their main objective is relief, if 
their administrative costs do not escalate as they build up 
power structures, and if their operations remain small-scale. 
The comparative advantage of non-governmental relief orga- 23 
nizations lies in the dedication and skills of their staffs. It 
has repeatedly been evident that once the scale of operations 
becomes large, non-governmental organizations’ ability to in- 
tervene effectively declines sharply. Rapacious governments 
start taking an interest in the relief operations which gener- 
ally succumb because they do not have the formal structures 
and defenses that large bilateral or multilateral institutions 
can use against undue influence by major donors or recip- 
ients. Large institutions, on the other hand, have a compara- 
tive disadvantage in handling labor-intensive, relief-oriented 
projects. 
Relief in the form of commodity aid is likely to be partic- 
ularly counterproductive on a large scale. Its origins lie in 
the surpluses of agricultural products created by protection. 
The aim of commodity aid is to maintain demand for farmers 
in protectionist countries at artificially high prices. Transfer-, 
ring such produce to developing countries has two effects: 
Firstly, the recipient country is freed from the necessity of 
improving policies so that agricultural productivity will 
rise. Secondly, farmers in the recipient countries are usually 
denied competitive market prices for their products. They 
indirectly subsidize farmers in the high-income countries. 
However desirable an international relief system may be, it 
is neither politically nor practically feasible. Contributions 
to non-governmental relief for developing countries are lim- 
ited in industrial countries, and so are the taxes that voters 
in high-income countries are willing to contribute to devel- 
opment assistance. In part, this is because voters in high- 
income countries understand the role that mismanagement 
and political ambition play in developing country destitu- 
tion. A choice has to be made. Even if the entire funds avail- 
able for relief and development assistance were directed to 
relief, the impact on the mass of poor farm families in deve- 
loping countries would be negligible. 
The principles informing development assistance are 
markedly different from those that determine relief mea- 
sures. Development assistance often does not have much im- 
pact on average living standards in the short run. The objec- 
24 tive is to assist developing countries at the margins of 
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investment, technological change, and institutional develop- 
ment. Cost-efficient development projects must be replicable 
by developing countries and they should have other demon- 
stration effects. The effectiveness and impact of development 
projects is a measure of their contribution to long-run growth 
with equity, that is, to the incomes of future generations. For 
example, a consideration of the trade-offs involved in assis- 
tance for rural development in sub-Saharan Africa in the 
1970s and 1980s suggests that if the entire official effort had 
been to support infrastructure and technological .advance, 
the results would have been much more effective than rural 
development turned out to be. The poor rural families of sub- 
Saharan Africa have thus paid a high price for the self-indul- 
gent clamor of donors that poverty be alleviated immediately. 
Political pressures are clouding the objectives of develop- 
ment assistance by blurring the differences between relief 
and development and muddying the analysis that sustained, 
long-term development requires. Genuine concerns that de- 
velopment assistance should lead to growth with equity and 
that environmental concerns should be taken into account in 
the process are being swamped by emotional pleas for “grass- 
roots” action. Another attack against the raising of standards 
of living comes from romantics who argue that the develop- 
ing countries do not need the crass materialism of industrial 
countries, but that some alternative pattern of development is 
preferable. That is, that people in developing countries do not 
need cars, trains or airplanes; the simple bicycle-based life 
will serve them better. Enough research has now been done 
to make it clear that this is not the attitude of the rural poor. 
The view of what a prosperous life means, is much the same 
throughout the world. More puzzlingly, idealistic develop- 
ment professionals, responding to conditions in poor rural 
areas, have not sharpened their analytical insights, but claim 
that traditional development strategies that focused on hu- 
man and physical investment, productivity, and employment 
have failed. The experience of the 1970s and 1980s has ex- 
posed this “soft” view of development for the fallacy that it is. 
The policies that actually benefit the poor follow convention- 
al development paths of investment, productivity, employ- 
ment creation, and high export growth. In countries that have 25 
focused on grass-roots issues, all but a small proportion of 
the population have remained poor. They are often poorer 
now than they were 10 years ago. Countries that have fol- 
lowed the dependencia philosophy are the countries that ex- 
tended inappropriate macroeconomic policies by borrowing 
abroad and now have unmanageable debts. The “softening” 
of development analysis has -softened the “dialogues” that 
international and bilateral institutions hold with developing 
countries. They are increasingly marked by weak compro- 
mises that encourage governments to continue on low-growth 
paths with a bias against agricultural productivity. 
Options for the future 
The policy choices that have to be made for further agri- 
cultural development are becoming clearer. In the initial 
stages, new technologies were often employment-creating 
(through double-cropping, for example). There may be some 
further opportunities for employment creation in countries 
with limited agricultural technologies, notably in sub- 
Saharan Africa. But at later stages when machines replace 
people [whether technologies are land- or labor-saving], there 
is a growing need for chemical inputs and for mechanized 
processing. Whereas early productivity changes were often 
farm-size neutral, as production’becomes more sophisti- 
cated, farm size has to expand to take advantage of technolog- 
ical change. Farming requires better-educated entrepreneurs. 
The farm sector sheds labor. Similar transformations are 
going on in non-farm employment in rural areas. Rising 
skills, higher standards of entrepreneurship, and large-scale 
business or farming units are required. The economies of 
agglomeration are lacking in rural areas, drawing business to 
townships, district towns, and industrial and service centers. 
Urbanization is an important part of the transformation of 
traditional economies. 
To catch up with agricultural productivity in industrial 
countries, developing countries will have to accelerate their 
commitment to technological change. From an employment 
point of view, this will be possible only if non-agricultural 
and urban sectors increase their growth to rates reached by 
leading developing countries. Policies that hold reserve arm- 
ies of cheap, unskilled labor in the countryside will lead to 
stagnation and hardship that no amount of grass-roots sup- 
port can relieve. Development assistance should be moving 
strongly toward investment in infrastructure. To stimulate 
agricultural development, infrastructure has to be comple- 
mented by technological development on an international, 
bilateral and particularly, on a national scale. 
Agricultural development cannot be considered in isola- 
tion. It is more dependent on macroeconomic and other econ- 
omy-wide policies than on specific intervention in the agri- 
cultural sector. Poverty in rural areas does not originate in 
the sector, but is the result of distorted signals throughout the 
economy. Where the signals are not distorted, agriculture has 
thrived and national income has been doubling every 10 
years or so. There are no economic reasons why any develop- 
ing country cannot achieve such results. The problems that 
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Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde Islands, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, 
Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guin- 
ea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mal- 
awi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Latin America and Caribbean 
Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Col- 
ombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Eucador, El Sal- 
vador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexi- 
co, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Trinidad, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
South Asia and China 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, China (Peoples Re- 
public of], India, Iran, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. 
Southeast and Northeast Asia and Pacific 
Brunei;Fiji, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea (Republic of), Mal- 
aysia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Solomon 
Islands, Thailand, Tonga, Vanuatu, Western Samoa. 
Mediterranean and Middle East 
Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Spain, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen 
(Arab Republic of), Yemen (People’s Democratic Republic of). 
Industrial countries 
Centrally planned 
Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Re- 
public, Korea Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Ro- 
mania, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia. 
Market-oriented 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Ja- 
pan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, United States. 29 
